#05 - Back or Bolt⚡

The technology is unique. Ultrasound has been 2D for 50 years. PIUR's hardware add-on converts any existing ultrasound machine into a tomographic 3D imaging device in a single 30-second sweep - no new machine required, no radiation, no expensive MRI. A radiologist currently has to simultaneously obtain and interpret a 2D image, which takes longer and depends heavily on individual skill. PIUR separates acquisition of data from analysis entirely, enabling telemedicine workflows that simply don't exist with current 2D ultrasound.

FDA approval and CPT-I reimbursement has been obtained. Most MedTech companies get stuck at one or the other. PIUR has both - and the CPT-I code (76377) means US hospitals can bill an additional $110 per examination just for using the device. That's not a nice-to-have; it's the difference between a product a procurement team has to fight for and one that pays for itself. Competitors Koios and Amcad only have CPT-III codes, which offer lower and less reliable reimbursement.

6 patent families across the US, Europe, Australia, China and Canada protect the core tracking and 3D reconstruction technology. Two are fully granted in all four major regions and are directly embedded in the FDA-approved commercial product.

GE HealthCare is a distribution partner. GE has 35%+ of the global ultrasound market. PIUR technology is deeply integrated into GE devices - not just co-marketed - and the joint European go-to-market is already live. The US launch with GE is planned for December 2026.

$30m ARR pipeline includes NYU (50 locations, $3.6M ARR potential from one account), Mayo Clinic, Mass General, and Columbia University, who are already paying customers.

The investor base contains Ascend Capital Partners (€3.67M invested), Aescuvest (€5.56M invested), Heinz-Walter Grosse (former CEO of B. Braun, one of Europe's largest MedTech companies), Christian Braun (B. Braun family), Udo Vetter (Vetter Pharma), and Josef Schabauer (former MD of Abbott Austria). These are not run-of-the-mill angel investors writing small cheques but are MedTech industry insiders who understand exactly what they are backing.

The exit strategy is clear. GE HealthCare, Siemens Healthineers, Philips, Canon Medical and Samsung Medison are all in competition for AI imaging capability. RadNet's acquisition of See-mode (a 2D competitor) shows the appetite exists. PIUR is the better asset.

€30M pre-money valuation against a comparable SaaS imaging AI peer group that trades at 10-20x ARR. If PIUR hits €7.6M ARR by 2027 as projected, €30M today starts to look cheap rather than expensive.

The revenue is tiny relative to the ambition. €586k in 2025, and flat year-on-year. The transition from hardware sales to SaaS subscriptions explains some of this, but going from €586k to €5.5M in a single year (2027 projection) requires the NYU deal, the GE US launch, and multiple Tier 1 closures all landing on schedule. In enterprise MedTech, they rarely do.

The balance sheet is under pressure. Accumulated losses of €12.78M, negative equity of ~€391k, and roughly 7-8 weeks of cash runway before this raise closes. The €290k monthly burn against €49k monthly revenue means PIUR needs the second closing of this Series B (approximately €10M, currently in negotiation) to land within 12 months or the runway runs out. A term sheet is apparently in negotiation, but that is not the same as signed.

The sales cycle is slow. 9-18 months to close a Tier 1 US hospital account. NYU has been "approaching closure" long enough to feature prominently in fundraising materials. One delayed procurement decision at a large account cascades into a materially worse financial position at €290k/month burn.

The raise is via a profit participation certificate structure (Genussscheine) rather than equity. There are pros and cons of this system, and it is common in German crowdfunding, however you do not get shares for this raise only the right to participate in profit distributions and exit proceeds.

Founder dilution is striking. Co-founders Frederik Bender and Robert Bauer together hold only 9.11% of the company after this round, which is low for a Series B and suggests either aggressive dilution in earlier rounds or a structure that may create misaligned incentives as the exit approaches. The majority of equity is held by institutional investors, with Aescuvest alone at 23.86%.

GE dependency is a double-edged sword. GE is both the biggest distribution opportunity and the biggest strategic risk. There are no minimum volume commitments in the partnership. If GE decides to develop competing 3D capability internally, or acquires a competitor, PIUR loses its primary scaling channel. GE could also wait and acquire PIUR at a lower valuation if the second closing is delayed.

EBITDA breakeven isn't projected until 2028 - and that projection assumes ARR grows from €85k at end of 2025 to €20M by 2028. The revenue projections (52x growth in three years) are not impossible given the named sales pipeline, but they are aggressive, and the margin for error at current burn rate is thin.